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Abstract
We set up a general equilibrium model, in which offshoring to a low-wage country can
lead to job polarisation in the high-wage country. Job polarisation is the result of a
reallocation of labour across firms that differ in productivity and pay wages that are
positively linked to their profits by a rent-sharing mechanism. Offshoring involves
fixed and task-specific variable costs, and as a consequence it is chosen only by the
most productive firms, and only for those tasks with the lowest variable offshoring
costs. A reduction in those variable costs increases offshoring at the intensive and at
the extensive margin, with domestic employment shifted from the newly offshoring
firms in the middle of the productivity distribution to firms at the tails of this
distribution, paying either very low or very high wages. We also study how the
reallocation of labour across firms affects economy-wide unemployment. Offshoring
reduces unemployment when it is confined to high-productivity firms, while this
outcome is not guaranteed when offshoring is also chosen by low-productivity firms.
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1 Introduction
The polarisation of jobs is a well-documented phenomenon for many industrialised economies.1
To rationalise this observation, economists usually refer to the routinisation hypothesis (cf. Autor
et al., 2003), which explains the disappearance of jobs from the middle of the wage distribution by a
movement of workers from jobs concentrated on routine tasks to jobs highly intensive in abstract or
service tasks at the upper and lower tail of the wage distribution, respectively. Whereas widespread
access to data on tasks and occupations has made this hypothesis a particularly attractive avenue
for empirical research, recent evidence from firm-level data is indicative of an alternative channel
so far ignored in the literature: the movement of workers between firms that differ in their wage
payments (Harrigan et al., 2016; Heyman, 2016; Kerr et al., 2016). Using information on the
employment changes in a sample of 5,754 German establishments between 1999 and 2005, Figure
1 documents job polarisation between those establishments, with employment in establishments
with initially high and low average wage rates increasing and employment in establishments paying
intermediate wage rates decreasing.2
Figure 1: Job polarisation between German establishments
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Log mean wage by group (in 1999)
Source: LIAB dataset from the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg. Dots
capture employment changes for 20 establishment groups (of equal size); The solid line
depicts the outcome of local polynominal smoothing, using Epanechnikov kernel-weighting
with degree 1 and bandwidth 1.71.
1For instance, Autor et al. (2006, 2008) and Autor and Dorn (2013) provide evidence for the US, whereas
Dustmann et al. (2009) and Goos et al. (2009, 2014) document job polarisation for various European economies.
2For constructing Figure 1, we only consider establishments that were observed in the base and in the end year
and, to control for the far-reaching labour market reforms in Germany between 2003 and 2005 as well as for other
macroeconomic shocks, we have normalised the data by expressing employment changes relative to the overall trend.
The reallocation of workers shown in Figure 1 is robust to changes in the covered time span and looks similar for the
periods 1999-2003 or 1999-2007. The pattern is also robust to changes in the number of wage groups, with a u-shape
being also found when accounting for 10 or 100 establishment categories, and it remains unaffected if managers are
excluded from the sample of workers.
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We argue in this paper that job polarisation along the firm margin, as captured by Figure
1, can be explained by the deepening of international economic integration in the recent past.
In particular, relying on the two well-established facts that (i) more productive firms pay higher
wages than their less productive competitors and that (ii) there is selection of the most productive
firms into international markets, we show that job polarisation can be explained by the increased
offshoring of production from high- to low-wage countries.3 The story we have in mind to explain
job polarisation between firms is straightforward: Suppose offshoring has fixed and variable costs,
where the latter are task-specific as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Furthermore, firms
differ in their productivity, and – crucially – there is some mechanism linking firm productivity
to firm-level average wages. In equilibrium, high-wage firms offshore some of their tasks, while
low-wage firms do not offshore at all. It is now natural for an across-the-board decrease in variable
offshoring costs to lead to job polarisation: Newly offshoring firms, which pay intermediate wages,
since they are less productive than the incumbent offshoring firms, but more productive than the
non-offshoring firms, reduce the number of their domestic jobs. This reduction in labour demand
causes a downward pressure on wages, and therefore incumbent offshoring firms as well as purely
domestic non-offshoring firms – i.e. the firms paying either very high or very low wages – increase
their domestic employment.4
To formalise the story outlined above and to shed light on its possible limitations, we set up a
general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition among heterogeneous firms. As in Lucas
(1978) each firm is run by an entrepreneur, who hires workers for production. Agents are equally
productive as workers, but differ in terms of their entrepreneurial ability, which is instrumental for
the productivity of firms and thus for the profit income that accrues to the entrepreneur as residual
claimant. The entry of firms and the economy-wide supply of labour are then jointly determined
by the decentralised occupational choice of agents, with entrepreneurial ability being pivotal for
the decision of who becomes an entrepreneur and who becomes a worker. To analyse offshoring
decisions, we place our analysis in an asymmetric two-country model, in which firms from an
industrialised North have an incentive to offshore the production of tasks to a developing South,
with lower wages. Trade in tasks is associated with fixed and variable offshoring costs. Assuming
that offshoring costs are the same for all producers, there is selection of firms into offshoring by
3Supportive evidence for the first fact can be found in empirical labour market research (see Blanchflower et al.
1996 and Abowd et al. 1999 for two early contributions and Card et al. 2013 for a more recent one). Regarding
the second fact, Bernard and Jensen (1995) provided first systematic evidence that exporters are larger and more
profitable than non-exporters, and the subsequent literature has pointed out that these differences are due to a
selection of better firms into exporting (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Recent work by Hummels et al. (2014)
and Moser et al. (2015) shows that the patterns of international market participation are similar if one considers
offshoring instead of exporting.
4Using offshoring information for 1999, we find that the u-shape in Figure 1 vanishes when restricting the sample
to establishments that were already classified as offshorers in the first observation year. This suggests that the asym-
metric behavior of offshoring and non-offshoring firms may well be an important determinant of the job polarisation
depicted in Figure 1.
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productivity, establishing an (endogenous) extensive firm margin that separates highly productive
offshoring firms from less productive non-offshoring firms. Assuming that variable offshoring costs
are task-specific as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), there is, in addition, an (endogenous)
extensive task margin that separates tasks kept onshore from tasks put offshore.
A framework for the analysis of job polarisation requires, of course, that not all workers are
paid the same wage. We therefore augment our model of offshoring by a labour market model
featuring rent sharing due to a fair-wage-effort mechanism (cf. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Egger
and Kreickemeier, 2012; Amiti and Davis, 2012). The resulting framework generates a positive
link between firm success and wages, because in the presence of fairness preferences firms with
higher operating profits have to pay higher wages in order to elicit the full level of non-contractible
effort from their workforce. We associate offshoring with vertical multinationals and, in line with
evidence from Budd and Slaughter (2004) and Budd et al. (2005), assume that intra-firm rent
sharing exists within and across borders so that wages of both domestic and foreign workers are
positively correlated with firm-level profits. The equilibrium then features two continuous wage
distributions, one in each country, with some workers in each country being unemployed due to
the labour market imperfection. Whereas the specific motive for rent sharing considered here is
attractive from the perspective of analytical tractability, relying on a fair-wage mechanism is by
no means essential for our results.5
To see how in the model outlined above job polarisation is linked to the phenomenon of off-
shoring, it is key to understand the firm-level employment effects of offshoring in the source country.
For this purpose, we distinguish between a direct effect, which captures the domestic firm-level re-
sponse to lower offshoring costs either by firms previously producing all their tasks onshore (new
offshorers) or by firms expanding the share of tasks put offshore (incumbent offshorers), and an in-
direct effect, which captures the domestic reallocation of workers changing their employment status
in response to the direct effect. As discussed in Egger et al. (2015), there are two countervailing
forces that contribute to the direct effect: On the one hand, offshoring firms replace domestic work-
ers by foreign ones in those tasks newly put offshore (the relocation effect). On the other hand,
there is cost saving from offshoring, which makes the offshoring firm more competitive and leads to
expansion of domestic employment in all tasks that remain onshore (the productivity effect). Simi-
lar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), the productivity effect works on infra-marginal tasks
5Any labour market model producing the result that more productive firms pay higher wages provides a vehicle
for linking job polarisation to offshoring. A possible alternative to the labour market model considered here is the
model of Helpman et al. (2010), which features random matching of heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and
workers that have match-specific abilities. Firms can screen their applicants to increase the average ability of their
workforce, and there is rent sharing due to Nash bargaining at the firm level. With a rent-sharing mechanism as
in Helpman et al. (2010), the reallocation of workers due to offshoring would be similar to our model, and hence
job polarisation can also materialise in a thus modified framework. Even if wage differentials were due to positive
assortative matching between heterogeneous firms and heterogeneous workers as in Sampson (2014), the mechanism
leading to job polarisation in our model remains valid.
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only, and it therefore becomes more relevant as the share of tasks moved offshore increases. As a
consequence, the relocation effect is dominant when only few firms offshore just a small fraction of
their tasks due to high offshoring costs, whereas the productivity effect is likely to dominate when
offshoring of many tasks becomes common practice among high- and low-productivity firms due
to low offshoring costs.6
Most important for explaining job polarisation, incumbent and new offshorers are affected by
the direct firm-level employment effects in different ways. Whereas incumbent offshoring firms
marginally expand their set of offshored tasks if the cost of offshoring declines, newly offshoring
firms shift abroad a discrete mass of tasks, including the marginal task as well as all infra-marginal
ones. Hence, there exists an intermediate level of offshoring costs such that via the direct effect
domestic employment of incumbent offshorers paying high wages increases while domestic em-
ployment of new offshorers paying intermediate wages falls. Provided that the direct employment
effects in newly and incumbent offshoring firms add up to an overall job loss, domestic workers set
free can be hired by other firms, including purely domestic ones paying low wages. Thereby our
model is able to generate the inter-firm worker movements illustrated in Figure 1, with firms in
the middle of the wage distribution losing jobs at the expense of firms at the opposite ends of the
wage distribution.
Since our model features economy-wide unemployment as a consequence of rent sharing, we can
also use it to address the politically charged question of whether offshoring to low-wage countries
destroys jobs in high-wage countries in the aggregate.7 We show that our model gives a nuanced
answer to this question, the main reason being that in general equilibrium it is of course possible
for workers who have lost their jobs due to offshoring to find employment elsewhere. Specifically,
for these workers our model points to three possible alternatives to unemployment: they may be
hired as production workers in a different firm, they may work in the offshoring service sector, or
they may become entrepreneurs themselves.8 Economy-wide unemployment in our model increases
in the extent of wage dispersion between firms, ceteris paribus, since the latter is a measure for
the severeness of the labour market distortion. We show that offshoring reduces wage dispersion
in the North relative to autarky if the offshoring cost is very high, and therefore only the most
productive firms use this option. With the labour market distortion less severe, offshoring leads to
6The existence of two countervailing forces in the determination of the direct firm-level employment effect and
changes in their relative importance provide a rationale for the inconclusive empirical evidence on the consequences
of offshoring for firm-level employment (cf. Sethupathy, 2013; Hummels et al., 2014; and Moser et al., 2015).
7As pointed out by The Economist (2009), “Americans became almost hysterical” about the job destruction due
to offshoring, when Forrester Research predicted a decade ago that 3.3 million American jobs will be offshored until
2015.
8Evidence from matched worker-firm-owner data shows that individuals who are unemployed (cf. Berglann et al.,
2011) or displaced from their job (cf. von Greiff, 2009) are more likely to become entrepreneurs. Furthermore, Autor
et al. (2014), Artuç and McLaren (2015), and Keller and Utar (2015) provide evidence that the movement of workers
to other sectors is an important channel for the adjustment of labour markets to globalisation shocks.
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lower aggregate unemployment in this case. We also show that this positive labour market effect
can be overturned at low levels of offshoring cost, since in this case wage dispersion between firms
increases.
Despite the voluminous empirical evidence on job polarisation (see for example Autor et al.,
2006; Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2009), there is a surprisingly small number of papers
providing theoretical reasoning for Autor et al.’s (2003) routinisation hypothesis. As a notable ex-
ception, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) set up a model featuring an endogenous assignment of skills to
tasks. Distinguishing three different worker types, they show that the replacement of routine tasks
through technological change or offshoring can explain job polarisation, with displaced medium-
skilled workers being reallocated to tasks previously performed by better-paid high-skilled workers
or worse-paid low-skilled workers, respectively. Costinot and Vogel (2010) formulate a model, in
which a continuum of workers sorts across a continuum of tasks depending on their comparative
advantage. As pointed out by the authors, this model is also equipped to explain job polarisa-
tion, for reasons not too different from those outlined by Acemoglu and Autor (2011). However,
focussing on a model with atomistic firms, neither Costinot and Vogel (2010) nor Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) can explain job polarisation along the firm dimension reported in Figure 1. Hence,
our model complements existing theoretical work by highlighting a new channel through which job
polarisation can materalise: the creation and destruction of jobs by firms that differ in their wage
payments.
Our model also builds on a large literature that studies the consequences of offshoring to
low-wage countries (cf. Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Rodriguez-Clare, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2015), including several recent
contributions that place their analysis in a framework with heterogeneous firms (cf. Antràs and
Helpman, 2004; Antràs et al., 2006; Davidson et al., 2008; Groizard et al., 2014; Egger et al., 2015).
Furthermore, accounting for labour market imperfections, our paper is related to an old and well
established literature dealing with the effects of globalisation on unemployment and wage inequality
(cf. Brecher, 1974; Davidson et al., 1988; Hosios, 1990), and more directly to the recent papers
by Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Helpman et al. (2010), Amiti and Davis (2012), and Egger
and Kreickemeier (2012), who analyse the link between international goods trade, residual wage
inequality and unemployment in models with firm heterogeneity. Although the rationale for a wage
premium in high-productivity firms in those papers extends one to one to our model, there is an
important difference between international trade and offshoring regarding the induced reallocation
of labour in the home country. Whereas international trade in these models unambiguously leads
to a shift of labour away from the low-wage firms towards the high-wage firms, offshoring in our
model has the potential to reallocate labour away from medium-wage firms towards high- and low-
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wage firms. Hence, explaining job polarisation along the firm dimension by international market
integration requires that the market integration is associated with more offshoring.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main building blocks of our model and
Section 3 introduces the rent-sharing mechanism. In Section 4, we solve for the general equilibrium.
In Section 5, we analyse the effects of falling (variable) offshoring costs on the domestic employment
of offshoring and non-offshoring firms and characterise the conditions under which job polarisation
materialises. In Section 6, we determine the effects of offshoring on economy-wide unemployment.
Section 7 concludes with a summary of the most important results.
2 The model: basics
We set up a two-country model of offshoring, in which a country called South, that in equilib-
rium has low wages, provides labour input for the offshore task production of firms that have
their headquarters in a high-wage country, called North. North has an endogenous mass M of
monopolistically competitive firms that produce horizontally differentiated goods. Each firm faces
a demand function
x(v) = Ap(v)−σ , (1)
where A is a variable capturing market size, v indexes the firm, and σ > 1 is the constant price
elasticity of demand. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we model firm v’s production as the
mapping of a continuum of tasks, uniformly distributed over the unit interval, into an output good
using a Cobb-Douglas technology. Firms use the same technology in all tasks, with one unit of
labour required for the production of one unit of each task. Denoting the production and usage of
task η in firm v by q(v, η), we specify the production function as
q(v) = ϕ(v) exp
[
∫ 1
0
ln q(v, η)dη
]
, (2)
where ϕ(v) is a firm-specific productivity parameter. Tasks differ in terms of the variable costs for
moving them offshore, and without loss of generality we order the tasks in such a way that these
costs are increasing in η. Specifically, we borrow from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, p.
1986) the functional form:
t̂(η) = τ(1 − η)−t, (3)
with τ > 1 and t > 0. Thereby, τ represents the variable offshoring cost for the task with the lowest
such cost, and with the elasticity of t̂(η) given by tη/(1 − η), higher values of shape parameter t
are associated with a more steeply increasing offshoring cost schedule.
A profit maximising firm in our model has to make three decisions: It must decide whether or
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not to offshore part of its task production (this determines the extensive firm margin), and – in
case it chooses to offshore at all – it needs to decide for which tasks it wants to use this option
(this is the extensive task margin), and how much labour it wants to employ in the production of
each task (this is the intensive task margin). We focus on the determination of the task margins
first and postpone the determination of the extensive firm margin until Section 4.
The extensive task margin is determined by indifference condition t̂[η̂(v)]ws(v) = wn(v), where
wn(v) and ws(v) denote the wage rates paid by firm v in the North and the South, respectively,
and η̂(v) denotes both the marginal task offshored and the share of tasks offshored by firm v.9
Substituting for t̂(η) from Eq. (3), we can rewrite the indifference condition for the extensive task
margin as
η̂(v) = 1 −
[
τws(v)
wn(v)
]
1
t
, (4)
with general equilibrium constraints introduced below ensuring η̂(v) ∈ (0, 1).
Turning to the intensive task margin, the Cobb-Douglas technology in Eq. (2) implies that
profit maximising firms allocate expenditure equally across tasks. We show in the Appendix that
the resulting unit cost function can be written as
c(v) =
wn(v)
ϕ(v) exp {I(v) ln κ[η̂(v)]} , (5)
where I(v) is an indicator function, taking the value of one in the case of offshoring and the value
of zero otherwise, and
κ[η̂(v)] ≡
(
1
[1 − η̂(v)] exp[η̂(v)]
)t
. (6)
Thereby, κ[η̂(v)] is firm v’s productivity gain due to offshoring in the case where the firm has chosen
both task margins in order to minimise unit costs. Intuitively, we have κ[η̂(v)] = 1 if η̂(v) = 0 and
dκ[η̂(v)]/dη̂(v) > 0.10
3 The labour market
We now show how firm-specific wage rates wℓ(v) are determined in our model. In accordance
with a large body of empirical labour market research, we postulate a framework that generates
firm-specific wage rates due to firm-level rent-sharing. As in Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) and
Egger et al. (2013), the particular rent sharing model we are using is based on the fair-wage effort
9In order to save on notation, we omit country indices ℓ = n, s whenever it does not cause confusion.
10The offshoring-induced increase in productivity at the firm level is the direct analogue in our framework to the
economy-wide productivity increase in the model of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
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mechanism of Akerlof and Yellen (1990).11 We are following Akerlof and Yellen (1990) in assuming
that workers exert full effort, normalised to one, if and only if they are paid at least the wage they
consider fair, ŵℓ, ℓ = n, s, while they reduce their effort proportionally if the wage falls short of
the fair wage. The functional relationship between effort e and wage rate wℓ is therefore given by
e = min
{
wℓ
ŵℓ
, 1
}
. (7)
Firms are wage setters, and as in other efficiency wage models they set wℓ in order to minimise
the cost per efficiency unit of labour. Given Eq. (7), firms have no incentive to pay less than
ŵℓ, since effort would fall proportionally with the wage. Paying more than ŵℓ would increase the
wage per efficiency unit of labour, and therefore firms would not do that either, unless it were
necessary in order to attract the optimal number of workers. Attracting workers is clearly no issue
for firms in the presence of involuntary unemployment, and we therefore have wℓ = ŵℓ whenever
such unemployment exists in equilibrium.
Workers’ subjective evaluation of a fair wage depends on a firm-internal and a firm-external
reference point. Following Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) and Egger et al. (2013), we associate the
firm-external reference point with the income a worker can expect outside the job, which equals the
average labour income in the economy. Denoting the unemployment rate of production workers
by uℓ and the average wage per production worker by w̄ℓ, average labour income in country ℓ is
given by (1 − uℓ)w̄ℓ. The firm-internal reference point is the operating profit of the firm, π(v).
Via this firm-specific reference point, rent sharing co-determines the fair wage in our model, and
it therefore influences wage setting at the firm level. Assuming that the fair wage is a weighted
geometric average of the two components we obtain
ŵℓ(v) = π(v)
θ [(1 − uℓ)w̄ℓ]1−θ, (8)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) captures the strength of the rent-sharing motive in the fair-wage considerations of
workers. We show below that the equilibrium in our model features involuntary unemployment in
both markets. Therefore, all firms, even those with low productivity, are able to attract workers
by paying the fair wage, and hence we have wℓ(v) = ŵℓ(v), for ℓ = n, s.
12 The specification of the
11The fair-wage-effort mechanism is supported by empirical evidence from laboratory experiments (cf. Fehr et al.,
1993, 1998b,a), field experiments (cf. Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube et al., 2013), and natural experiments (cf. Lee
and Rupp, 2007). See Charness and Kuhn (2011) as well as List and Rasul (2011) for surveys on laboratory and
field experiments in labour economics. Fehr et al. (2009) provide a detailed survey over the extensive experimental
evidence in favour of the fair-wage-effort mechanism.
12Since total firm-level profits are a determinant of firm-level wages in both countries, our model features not only
national but also international rent-sharing. Evidence supportive of international rent sharing within multinational
firms is provided by Budd and Slaughter (2004), Dobbelaere (2004), Budd et al. (2005), and Martins and Yang (2015).
Egger and Kreickemeier (2013) develop a model with fair wage preferences as in Eq. (8) and show how international
rent sharing can lead to a multinational wage premium in general equilibrium if countries are asymmetric.
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fair wage constraint in Eq. (8) then implies that the intra-firm wage differential ws(v)/wn(v) does
not differ between firms:
ws(v)
wn(v)
= ω1−θ with ω ≡ (1 − us)w̄s
(1 − un)w̄n
, (9)
where ω is the ratio of average labour incomes in the two countries. As a consequence, the extensive
task margin η̂ and the firm-level productivity gain due to offshoring κ are the same for all firms:
η̂ = 1 − τ 1t ω 1−θt , (4′)
κ =
[
1
(1 − η̂) exp(η̂)
]t
. (6′)
With κ being not specific to the firm, it is now straightforward to derive the effect of offshoring on
firm-level operating profits and firm-level wages. In doing so, we replace the generic firm index v
by firm productivity ϕ and an index for the offshoring status of the firm (o and d for “offshoring”
and “domestic”, respectively). The relative operating profits and relative domestic wages of two
firms with the same productivity but different offshoring status are jointly determined by
πo(ϕ)
πd(ϕ)
=
[
wo(ϕ)
wd(ϕ)
]
1
θ
and
πo(ϕ)
πd(ϕ)
=
[
wo(ϕ)
wd(ϕ)
1
κ
]1−σ
,
where the first equation follows from the fair wage constraint and the second equation follows from
goods market equilibrium (with x = q) and constant markup pricing. After simple transformations
we get
πo(ϕ)
πd(ϕ)
= κξ and
wo(ϕ)
wd(ϕ)
= κθξ, (10)
where ξ ≡ (σ − 1)/[1 + θ(σ − 1)] > 0 is the constant cross-regime elasticity of firm-level operating
profits with respect to the productivity gain from offshoring, κ. In direct analogy to Eq. (10), ξ
and θξ also denote the within-regime elasticities of firm-level operating profits and firm-level wages,
respectively, with respect to firm-level productivity, ϕ. Hence, our model predicts, in line with a
large empirical literature (cf. Blanchflower et al., 1996; Albaek et al., 1998; Idson and Oi, 1999;
Lallemand et al., 2007; Frias et al., 2012), that more productive firms make higher profits and pay
higher wages.
4 General equilibrium
Having derived links between the endogenous variables κ, η̂ and the ratio of average labour incomes
ω, we now introduce general equilibrium constraints to fully solve the model and analyse its
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comparative static properties. All goods produced under monopolistic competition serve as inputs
into a homogeneous consumption good that is produced under perfect competition with a CES
technology, à la Ethier (1982): Y =
[
∫
v∈V x(v)
(σ−1)/σ
]σ/(σ−1)
, where V denotes the set of available
intermediates. We choose the consumption good as the numéraire, and therefore the market size
variable A in Eq. (1) is equal to Y , the total volume and value of the consumption good produced
in the North. Trade is balanced, with North importing the task output produced in the South in
exchange for the consumption good.
Following Lucas (1978), we assume that each monopolistically competitive firm is run by a sin-
gle entrepreneur who acts as an owner-manager and is the residual claimant of the firm, receiving
as remuneration the firm’s operating profits net of fixed offshoring costs. Operating profits depend
on the entrepreneurial ability of the owner-manager, which determines (and is equal to) the pro-
ductivity of the firm, ϕ. We assume that the distribution of entrepreneurial ability is Pareto and
has support on interval [1,∞): G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−k, with shape parameter k > max{ξ, 1}.13 In the
North, being an entrepreneur is one of three possible occupations. Individuals could alternatively
seek employment as production workers (with uncertain wage and employment prospects), or they
could work in the perfectly competitive offshoring service sector (earning a guaranteed wage s).
In total, the North has an exogenous supply of Nn risk-neutral individuals, each inelastically sup-
plying one unit of labour. Differences in ability ϕ only matter for the income of entrepreneurs and
agents in the North choose the occupation yielding the highest expected income, acknowledging
their realisation of ϕ. In the South, there are Ns individuals, and we assume that they have no
choice but to seek employment as production workers, which is the simplest possible way to ensure
that the South is the low-wage country in equilibrium.
We now turn to the determination of the extensive firm margin χ, the share of firms that choose
offshoring rather than purely domestic production. Offshoring in our model involves a fixed cost s
resulting from using the services of one offshoring service worker. Two indifference conditions are
crucial in the process of determining χ. First, the marginal entrepreneur needs to be indifferent
between career paths. We focus on interior equilibria with χ < 1 (the parameter constraint
required for this outcome is introduced below), and therefore the marginal entrepreneur runs a non-
offshoring (domestic) firm, whose productivity we denote by ϕd. Assuming that the occupational
choice is irreversible, for instance due to occupation-specific education, the indifference condition
is given by
πd(ϕd) = (1 − un) w̄n = s, (11)
where incomes of all three career paths are endogenous. The second indifference condition requires
13The parameter constraint for k guarantees finite positive values of all variables of interest.
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the gain in operating profits for the marginal offshoring firm, whose productivity we denote by ϕo,
to be equal to the offshoring fixed cost:
πo(ϕo) − πd(ϕo) = s. (12)
Eqs. (11) and (12), together with the link between firm-level productivity and firm-level operating
profits derived in the previous section, imply a relationship between κ and the relative productivity
ϕd/ϕo, and using χ = [1 −G(ϕo)]/[1 −G(ϕd)] = (ϕd/ϕo)k we can write the equilibrium condition
for the extensive firm margin as
χ =
(
κξ − 1
)
k
ξ . (13)
The last building block of general equilibrium in our model is the link between relative labour
endowments of the two countries, Nn/Ns, and the ratio of average labour incomes, ω. For the
South, the equilibrium relationship between endowment Ns and the average labour income is
(1 − us) w̄s = γ
σ − 1
σ
Y
Ns
, (14)
where γ is the share of aggregate labour income accruing to the South, and we show in the Appendix
that it can be written as
γ ≡ η̂χ(1 + χ
−ξ/k)
1 + χ
. (15)
Intuitively, due to constant mark-up pricing the income of production workers is a fraction (σ−1)/σ
of total income, a fraction γ of which accrues to workers in the South. With more offshoring at
the extensive task and/or extensive firm margin, South’s income share γ rises, i.e. ∂γ/∂η̂ > 0 and
∂γ/∂χ > 0. For the North, the analogous equation is given by
(1 − un) w̄n = (1 − γ)
σ − 1
σ
Y
L
, (16)
with the additional complication that the total supply of production workers in the North, denoted
by L, is endogenous due to the occupational choice mechanism. In equilibrium L and Nn are linked
by
L =
(1 − γ) k(σ − 1)
k − ξ + (1 − γ) k(σ − 1)Nn, (17)
which can be derived, as we show in the Appendix, by combining the resource constraint Nn =
L + (1 + χ)M with the indifference condition in Eq. (11). It follows immediately from Eqs. (15)
and (17) that more offshoring along the two extensive margins is accompanied by a reduction in
11
Figure 2: General Equilibrium
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the supply of production workers.
Combining Eqs. (14), (16), and (17) we finally get
ω =
γ(σ − 1)k
k − ξ + (1 − γ) k(σ − 1)
Nn
Ns
, (18)
which we call the labour market constraint (LMC) since it links the three endogenous variables η̂,
χ, and ω to the relative endowment Nn/Ns. For a constant relative labour endowment, Eqs. (15)
and (18) imply that more offshoring along the two extensive margins leads to an increase in ω, the
relative average labour income of the South.
We can now solve for the four endogenous variables ω, κ, η̂ and χ using the indifference
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condition for the extensive task margin, Eq. (4′), the condition for the firm-level productivity gain
resulting from the optimally chosen intensive task margin in Eq. (6′), the equilibrium condition for
the extensive firm margin, Eq. (13), and the labour market constraint, Eq. (18). It is convenient
to illustrate the determination of equilibrium in Figure 1. The graphical representations of Eqs.
(13), (6′), and (4′) in Quadrants I to III are straightforward and do not require further elaboration.
The upward sloping locus in Quadrant IV represents the labour market constraint from Eq. (18),
drawn here as a functional relationship between χ and ω, with η̂ adjusting endogenously according
to the indifference condition for the extensive task margin given in Quadrant III. The downward
sloping locus in Quadrant IV is derived from the loci in Quadrants I to III, giving combinations of
χ and ω that are compatible with indifference along the extensive firm margin and the extensive
task margin as well as with the firm-level productivity gain resulting from the cost-minimising
intensive task margin. Since it summarises demand conditions for labour in the two countries,
we label the downward sloping locus in Quadrant IV the labour demand locus (LDL). Intuitively,
offshoring is chosen by more firms if the relative average labour income of the South is lower and
it therefore becomes relatively cheaper for firms to hire Southern labour.
Existence of an interior equilibrium requires that the two loci LMC and LDL intersect at χ < 1.
According to Eqs. (4′) and (18), a unique intersection point exists under the parameter constraint
η̂int(σ − 1)k
k − ξ + (1 − η̂int)k(σ − 1)
Nn
Ns
> (1 − η̂int)
t
1−θ , (19)
assumed in the following, where η̂int is the maximum share of tasks that is offshored in an interior
equilibrium with χ < 1. Supremum η̂int lies in the unit interval, and from Eqs. (6
′) and (13)
it is implicitly given by 2 = (1 − η̂int)−tξ exp[−η̂inttξ]. Intuitively, condition (19) shows that an
interior equilibrium requires the South to be sufficiently small, measured by its relative population
size Ns/Nn. In this case, the wage differential between the two markets narrows quickly as more
and more firms offshore more and more tasks, and hence the least productive firm always finds
it advantageous to produce all tasks at home, thereby avoiding the fixed (and variable) costs of
offshoring.
The effects of a reduction in variable offshoring costs τ can now be readily analysed using
Figure 2. A decline in τ from τ0 to τ1 implies that the indifference condition for the extensive
task margin in Quadrant III is shifted downward: a given share of offshored tasks η̂ is compatible
with a higher average labour income in the South, ceteris paribus, if the offshoring cost is lower.
The labour demand locus in Quadrant IV is shifted downward to the exact same extent, since, as
shown above, profit maximisation implies that a constant extensive task margin η̂ is accompanied
by a constant external firm margin χ. The change in ω compatible with a constant extensive
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task margin is indicated by point A in Quadrants III and IV. The labour market constraint also
shifts downward, but by less than the LDL. This is seen as follows: For a given η̂, labour market
equilibrium requires that an increase in ω is accompanied by an increase in χ. Therefore, the
shifted LMC in Figure 2 must go through a point such as A′ that is strictly to the right of point A.
The new equilibrium is at point B, which satisfies both LMC and LDL. A reduction in the variable
costs of offshoring therefore leads to more offshoring along the extensive firm and the extensive
task margin. The firm-level productivity gain due to offshoring increases, while at the same time
the increased relative demand for Southern workers leads to an increase in their relative average
income.
5 Offshoring and firm level employment
We now turn to the effect of a change in offshoring costs on the allocation of workers between firms
in the North. For this purpose, we first write domestic firm-level employment in non-offshoring
firms and offshoring firms as
ln ld(ϕ, η̂) = ln(σ − 1) + (1 − θ)ξ lnϕ+ µ(η̂), (20)
ln lo(ϕ, η̂) = ln(σ − 1) + (1 − θ)ξ lnϕ+ µ(η̂) + λ(η̂), (21)
where λ(η̂) and µ(η̂) are defined as
λ(η̂) ≡ [1 − t(1 − θ)ξ] ln(1 − η̂) − t(1 − θ)ξη̂, (22)
µ(η̂) ≡ −
[
(1 − θ)ξ
k
]
ln
{
1 + χ(η̂) +
k(σ − 1)
k − ξ
[
1 + (1 − η̂)χ(η̂) − η̂χ(η̂)
k−ξ
k
]
}
. (23)
Eqs. (20) and (21) show that domestic employment for both types of firms is increasing in firm
productivity with constant elasticity (1 − θ)ξ. Furthermore, domestic firm-level employment is
affected by the share of offshored tasks η̂ via two separate channels, which we have summarised
in the respective terms λ(η̂) and µ(η̂): The term λ(η̂) appears only in Eq. (21), indicating that it
represents the direct link between η̂ and employment in those firms that conduct offshoring. The
term µ(η̂) is common to both equations, showing that it represents indirect market forces that
affect employment in all firms equally. While Eqs. (20) and (21) are written as functions of the
endogenous variable η̂, we have shown above that there is a monotonic link between η̂ and the
exogenous offshoring cost parameter τ . We can therefore analyse the comparative statics in terms
of η̂, in the understanding that an increase in η̂ is the result of a decrease in τ .
We focus on the direct effect of offshoring on domestic firm-level employment first, since the
indirect effect common to all firms is a second-round effect that is easily understood once the sign
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Figure 3: Direct and indirect employment effects of offshoring
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of the first-round effect is known. As shown above, if an increase in η̂ in our model is the result
of a reduction in τ , then χ, the share of firms that choose offshoring, increases as well. In the
following we will therefore carefully distinguish the effect a reduction in τ has on the domestic
employment in incumbent offshoring firms from the effect it has on domestic employment in the
newly offshoring firms.
Eq. (21) shows that the direct effect on the log of domestic employment in incumbent offshoring
firms is equal to λ′(η̂). It is the composite of a positive productivity effect, capturing the increase
of domestic employment as a result of increased output, and a negative relocation effect, capturing
the reduction in domestic employment due to the relocation of tasks to the South.14 Since the
productivity effect works on infra-marginal tasks only, as pointed out by Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008), it is increasing in η̂, therefore becoming more important at higher levels of
offshoring. On the other hand, the absolute value of the relocation effect is decreasing in η̂ since
with a high η̂ employment in newly offshored tasks is relatively low as firms have already shifted
employment towards the cheaper tasks moved offshore before. Overall therefore, λ′(η̂) is negative
at η̂ = 0, and it is monotonically increasing in η̂, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3.
Whether or not λ′(η̂) turns positive at some η̂ < η̂int depends on offshoring cost parameter t.
As we show in the Appendix, there exists a threshold level t1 that is implicitly defined by
ln 2 = −t1ξ ln
(
1 − 1
t1(1 − θ)ξ
)
− 1
1 − θ , (24)
14These two counteracting effects are also present in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). However, the analogy
is not perfect, since firms in the model of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg are atomistic, and hence they frame their
discussion in terms of changes in aggregate labour demand rather than in terms of changes in firm-level employment.
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and that has the following interpretation: If and only if t > t1, λ
′(η̂) becomes positive at some
η̂ < η̂int, implying that the productivity effect dominates at high levels of η̂, and therefore at
this stage a reduction in variable offshoring costs increases domestic employment in incumbent
offshoring firms. Intuitively, a high value of t is conducive to λ′(η̂) > 0 because the elasticity of the
offshoring cost schedule is increasing in t and therefore a high value of t implies for a given η̂ large
cost savings on infra-marginal tasks, which in turn means that the productivity effect is large. In
the following, we focus on the empirically relevant case t > t1, which allows the domestic firm-level
employment effect of offshoring to be negative (cf. Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007; Mion and Zhu,
2013; Hummels et al., 2014; Monarch et al., 2016) or positive (cf. Hakkala and Huttunen, 2015;
Moser et al., 2015), depending on the share of offshored tasks η̂. We denote by η̂tm, implicitly
defined by λ′(η̂tm) = 0, the critical level above which λ
′(η̂) becomes positive.15
We now turn to the newly offshoring firms, and to the direct effect that an increase in η̂ has on
domestic employment in those firms. Newly offshoring firms move abroad in one go all tasks η ≤ η̂,
and therefore the direct firm-level employment effect for those firms is given by λ(η̂) =
∫ η̂
0 λ
′(η)dη.
We depict λ(η̂) in Figure 3 as the difference between the blue area below λ′(η̂) and the red area
above λ′(η̂). Figure 3 shows that for values of η̂ larger than but sufficiently close to η̂tm an increase
in η̂ is associated with a direct domestic employment effect that is positive for incumbent offshoring
firms (λ′ is positive) but negative for newly offshoring firms (λ is negative). The latter effect is
novel relative to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008): Since in their model the firm population
is homogenous (firms are atomistic), the extensive firm margin is absent, and hence, using our
terminology, all firms are incumbent offshoring firms. As we show in the following, the direct
employment effect in newly offshoring firms, and the fact that it can be different from the effect in
incumbent firms, is important for understanding the link between offshoring and job polarisation
along the firm dimension.
The sum of the direct employment effects for the two groups of firms induces an indirect
effect µ′(η̂), which represents second-round employment adjustments due to the changing market
conditions and according to Eqs. (20) and (21) is the same for all firms. The fundamental logic
behind the indirect effect is straightforward: A net employment loss in offshoring firms tends to
put downward pressure on the wages of production workers. In response to lower wages all firms
(including new entrants at the lower end of the productivity distribution) increase their domestic
employment. The strength of the second-round effect µ′(η̂) is inversely related to the strength of
the first-round employment response in offshoring firms, and it therefore becomes less positive as
η̂ increases. We show formally in the Appendix and illustrate in the right panel of Figure 3 that,
15Focussing on the domestic employment of incumbent offshoring firms in the U.S., Sethupathy (2013) does not
find a significant effect of a reduction in the cost of offshoring to Mexico. In view of our model, this indicates an
extensive task margin for US firms in the neighbourhood of η̂tm
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consistent with this logic, µ′(η̂) is positive at η̂ = 0, and it becomes negative for high values of η̂,
provided that µ′(η̂) = 0 has a solution in interval (0, η̂int].
This fundamental logic needs to be qualified, since workers losing their job due to a negative
first-round effect can find employment in the offshoring service sector or become unemployed,
thereby weakening the link between direct and indirect domestic firm-level employment effects. To
ensure that these additional effects do not alter our results, we impose two parameter constraints,
whose derivation is delegated to the Appendix. First, there is a minimum threshold for t, denoted
by t2 and implicitly defined by µ
′(η̂tm) = 0. A larger t increases the elasticity of the variable
offshoring cost schedule t̂(η) and thus weakens the extensive task margin, ceteris paribus. With
fewer foreign workers hired by incumbent offshorers in response to a fall in τ , relative foreign
labour income increases by less and hence more firms start to offshore, thereby strengthening the
extensive firm margin. This leads to a larger displacement of domestic workers by newly offshoring
firms and thus provides a stronger impetus for the second-round reallocation of labour at η̂tm.
Second, we need to impose a constraint on parameters θ and σ to ensure the existence of a
finite threshold t2 and assume that
1 − (σ − 1)
[
1 − θ − θk
k − ξ
]
< 0. (25)
For the limiting case of θ = 0, labour markets are competitive and, in this case, (25) reduces
to σ > 2. To understand this condition, it is worth noting that the labour requirement for the
fixed cost of offshoring is the same for all firms. However, the displacement of workers by newly
offshoring firms is larger ceteris paribus for firms with higher productivity, because these are the
firms with larger domestic employment in each task prior to offshoring. For small new offshorers
the displacement of domestic workers can therefore be dominated by the additional labour demand
for the fixed cost of offshoring. Whereas a larger t strengthens the displacement of workers by newly
offshoring firms, the additional displacement by the marginal offshoring firm decreases, because
it is a firm with lower productivity. Hence, for high values of t it is possible that new offshorers
actually increase their domestic labour demand, and to ensure that overall the labour demand of
offshoring firms decreases, we must constrain the entry of small firms into offshoring. We can do
so by introducing a lower threshold for σ, because a higher σ increases the elasticity of profits with
respect to productivity and hence makes it more difficult for smaller firms to bear the fixed cost
of offshoring. This implies that µ′(η̂tm) > 0 holds for all possible t > t2.
In the case of θ > 0, changes in σ interact with the extent of rent sharing. This can be seen
in Section 3, where we have shown that for θ > 0 a larger σ widens the wage dispersion. Since
the wage dispersion is directly linked to the labour market distortion from rent sharing, we must
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impose a joint constraint on θ and σ to make sure that a displacement of domestic workers by
newly offshoring firms is neither offset by an increase in the labour demand for the fixed cost of
offshoring nor offset by a strong increase in domestic unemployment due to an exacerbation of the
labour market distortion.
Proposition 1 Let η̂0p be implicitly defined by λ
′(η̂0p) + µ
′(η̂0p) = 0 and let η̂
1
p be equal to η̂int if
µ′(η̂int) > 0 or implicitly defined by µ
′(η̂1p) = 0 otherwise. Then, if t > max{t1, t2} and the param-
eter constraint in (25) holds, there exists an interval around η̂tm with infimum η̂
0
p and supremum
η̂1p, such that a reduction of offshoring costs leads to job polarisation if η̂ ∈ (η̂0p, η̂1p).
Proof See the Appendix.
At the lower interval bound η̂0p employment in incumbent offshoring firms stays constant, as il-
lustrated in Figure 3. Below this lower bound λ′(η̂) + µ′(η̂) is negative, and therefore reducing τ
would lead to less employment in (high-wage) incumbent offshoring firms, which is in contradiction
to what is observed with job polarisation. At the upper interval bound η̂1p we have to distinguish
the two possible cases η̂1p < η̂int and η̂
1
p = η̂int. In the first case, employment in non-offshoring
firms stays constant at η̂ = η̂1p, and η̂ > η̂
1
p would imply µ
′(η̂) < 0 and thus less employment in
non-offshoring firms if τ falls. Again, this is in contradiction to what is observed with job polari-
sation. In the second case, η̂ > η̂1p is not possible. Inside the interval η̂ ∈ (η̂0p , η̂1p) a reduction in τ
leads to exactly the firm-level employment changes that is observed with job polarisation: lower
employment in newly offshoring firms in the middle of the wage distribution and higher employ-
ment in non-offshoring firms as well as in incumbent offshoring firms at the two tails of the wage
distribution.
Figure 4 is an alternative way of illustrating job polarisation in our model by showing firm-
level domestic employment as a function of firm-level productivity. The black curve shows the
initial equilibrium, with cutoff productivities denoted by ϕ0d and ϕ
0
o, respectively. A small decline
in τ leads to the red employment profile with cutoff productivities ϕ1d and ϕ
1
o. Employment
increases in non-offshoring firms with low productivity and in incumbent offshoring firms with
high productivity, but decreases in newly offshoring firms, which have intermediate productivity
levels.
6 Offshoring and Unemployment
As discussed above, the firm-specific fair wage constraints in our model are only binding if firms
can attract the desired number of production workers in both countries by paying the fair wage
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Figure 4: The case of job polarisation
implied by those constraints. This in turn requires that there is involuntary unemployment of
production workers in both countries, since only in this case it is possible
1. for the marginal firm with productivity ϕd to attract the desired number of workers, or
indeed any workers, in the North by paying the domestic fair wage ŵn(ϕd), and
2. for the marginal offshoring firm with productivity ϕo to attract the desired number of workers,
or indeed any workers, in the South by paying the foreign fair wage ŵs(ϕo).
Here we show that our model necessarily features involuntary unemployment of production workers
in both countries in any equilibrium that has more productive firms pay higher wages, implying
that it is indeed an equilibrium that all active firms pay their workers the respective fair wage (but
not more).
Crucial for this result are three conditions already introduced above. The first is the indifference
condition for the marginal entrepreneur in the domestic economy πd(ϕd) = (1 − un)w̄n, the other
two are the domestic fair wage constraint for the marginal firm with productivity ϕd and the
foreign fair wage constraint for the marginal offshoring firm with productivity ϕo:
ŵn(ϕd) = [πd(ϕd)]
θ[(1 − un)w̄n]1−θ, ŵs(ϕo) = [πo(ϕo)]θ[(1 − us)w̄s]1−θ.
Together, these conditions imply
ŵn(ϕd) = (1 − un)w̄n and ŵs(ϕo) = D(1 − us)w̄s, (26)
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with D ≡
(
κξχ−ξ/kω−1
)θ
> 1 comprising general equilibrium variables that are the same for all
producers. It is easily checked in Eq. (26) that any equilibrium with ŵn(ϕd) = wn(ϕd), ŵs(ϕo) =
ws(ϕo), and firm-specific wage rates that are increasing in firm productivity must feature un > 0
and us > 0. Hence, in equilibrium firms pay the firm-specific fair wages both at home and abroad.
Whereas always strictly positive, the unemployment rate in the South decreases monotonically
in η̂, because Southern workers can only be employed in the production of offshored tasks. A richer
pattern arises for the relationship between η̂ and the unemployment rate in the North. From Eq.
(26) it is immediate that the unemployment rate of Northern production workers can be written
as
un = 1 −
wn(ϕd)
w̄n
, (27)
meaning it increases in wage dispersion, measured by the ratio of the average wage of employed
workers and the wage paid by the marginal firm. The monotonic link between unemployment
and wage dispersion is intuitive, because wage dispersion is the result of rent sharing, which
in turn is the only source of labour market imperfection in our fair-wage model. Higher wage
dispersion reflects a stronger labour market distortion from rent sharing, resulting in a higher
rate of unemployed production workers. As we show in the Appendix, one can substitute for the
endogenous wage ratio wn(ϕd)/w̄n to express un as a function of model parameters and η̂:
un =
θξ + (k − ξ) [1 − δ(η̂)]
θξ + (k − ξ) , (28)
with δ(0) = 1. For strictly positive but small values of η̂ we have δ(η̂) > 1. The intuition
for this result is straightforward: Starting from autarky, offshoring leads to the destruction of
high-wage jobs in the North, and therefore to a reduction in the wage dispersion, which in turn
reduces the labour market distortion from rent sharing and lowers the unemployment rate of
production workers. We also show that δ(η̂) < 1 if η̂ is high, because a further increase of η̂
from an already high level leads to the creation of high-wage jobs in incumbent offshoring firms,
increasing the wage dispersion and therefore exacerbating the labour market distortion from rent
sharing. Hence, offshoring reduces the unemployment rate of domestic production workers relative
to autarky if η̂ is low, while the reverse is true η̂ is high. We show in the Appendix that there
exists a unique threshold η̂u, such that offshoring decreases (increases) the unemployment rate of
production workers if η̂ < (>)η̂u.
Since only production workers can be unemployed in our model, the economy-wide unemploy-
ment rate in the North is given by Un ≡ unL/Nn. We have shown above that the number of
production workers falls monotonically in η̂, due to changes in the occupational choice, and with
un decreasing in η̂ as well if η̂ is low, we know that unemployment Un definitely falls in this case.
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On the other hand, a further increase of η̂ from an already high level is accompanied by an in-
crease in un and therefore the effect on economy-wide unemployment Un is not clear a priori in
this case. We show in the Appendix that depending on parameter values indeed either effect can
be dominant. The following proposition summarises our insights regarding the effects of offshoring
on economy-wide unemployment.
Proposition 2 A reduction of offshoring costs lowers economy-wide unemployment in the North
if η̂ is low. An increase in unemployment relative to autarky is possible if η̂ is high.
Proof See the Appendix.
7 Conclusion
Empirical studies have found job polarisation to be pervasive across many developed economies over
the past two decades. The leading explanation for this phenomenon is the routinisation hypothesis
that builds on the idea that technological change and offshoring have made routine tasks obsolete
and, provided that routine tasks are performed by workers with a medium skill level, this has caused
a disappearance of jobs in the middle of the wage distribution. In this paper, we put forward an
alternative explanation that is rooted in two well-documented empirical facts: the selection of
more productive firms into offshoring; and the positive link between firm performance measures
and wage payments. We propose an offshoring model that accords with these two observations and
show that in our framework the decrease in variable offshoring costs implies that more firms choose
offshoring, and they choose it for a wider range of tasks. At intermediate levels of offshoring costs
this leads to job polarisation in the source country of offshoring, since the following three things
happen: newly offshoring producers, which have intermediate productivity, reduce the number of
domestic jobs, while incumbent offshoring producers with high productivity and low-productivity
non-offshoring firms increase the number of domestic jobs under the then more advantageous
labour market conditions. At least one of these three effects fails to materialise if offshoring costs
are very high or very low, and hence our model allows us to describe the conditions under which
job polarisation can be expected to occur.
Wage differences between firms in our model are the result of a labour market distortion from
rent sharing that also leads to involuntary unemployment among production workers, and we show
that changes in offshoring costs lead to non-monotonic effects on the rate of involuntary unemploy-
ment of production workers in the source country of offshoring. Accounting for the endogenous
adjustment in the supply of production workers due to an occupational choice mechanism, we show
that lower offshoring costs lead to lower economy-wide unemployment when offshoring costs are
high, whereas the opposite can happen when offshoring costs are already low.
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first attempt to highlight movements of
workers between firms that offer different wages as an important channel through which offshoring
can generate job polarisation. A first glance at firm-level data from Germany shows that the
reallocation of workers across firms mirrors the creation and destruction of jobs along the wage
distribution found by other studies. Whereas this evidence is only suggestive, we hope that our
model can provide guidance for future empirical research to shed light on the importance of job
polarisation between firms relative to the routinisation hypothesis that explains job polarisation
by the movement of workers between jobs with differing task compositions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (5)
In view of the Cobb-Douglas technology in Eq. (2) – which puts equal weights on all tasks – cost
minimisation over q(v, η) gives the well-known result that expenditures of a firm are the same for
all of its tasks. This links the production of task η < 1 to the production of task 1. We have
q(v, η) =



(
1−η
1−η̂(v)
)−t
q(v, 1) for all η ≤ η̂(v)
q(v, 1) for all η > η̂(v)
, (A.1)
where η̂(v) = 0 if firm v performs all of its tasks domestically and η̂(v) > 0, otherwise. The
total variable costs of producing intermediate goods output in quantity of q(v) can then be
expressed as C(v) = q(v, 1)w(v). According to Eq. (2), output of firm v can be written as
q(v) = ϕ(v)q(v, 1) exp{I(v) ln κ[η̂(v)]}, where κ[η̂(v)] is given by Eq. (6) and I(v) is an indica-
tor function with value 1 if the firm is engaged in offshoring and value 0, otherwise. The unit cost
in Eq. (5) is finally obtained when dividing C(v) by q(v).
A.2 Derivation of Eq. (15)
The global wage bill is the aggregate labour income of production workers in the North and the
South and, in view of constant markup pricing, proportional to global operating profits:
(1 − un)Lw̄n + (1 − us)Nsw̄s = Nn(σ − 1)
[
∫ ϕo
ϕd
πd(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕo
πo(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
]
. (A.2)
Making use of Eqs.(10) and (13) and accounting for πd(ϕ)/πd(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)
ξ , we can compute
(1 − un)Lw̄n + (1 − us)Nsw̄s = M(σ − 1)πd(ϕd)
k
k − ξ (1 + χ). (A.3)
In a similar vein, we can compute the wage bill accruing to domestic workers, according to
(1 − un)Lw̄n = Nn(σ − 1)
[
∫ ϕo
ϕd
πd(ϕ)dG(ϕ) + η̂
∫ ∞
ϕo
πo(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
]
= M(σ − 1)πd(ϕd)
k
k − ξ
[
1 + (1 − η̂)χ− η̂χ
k−ξ
k
]
. (A.4)
Dividing Eq. (A.4) by Eq. (A.3) and subtracting the resulting expression from 1 establishes γ in
Eq. (15). This completes the proof.
A.3 Derivation of Eq. (17)
Combining Eqs. (15) and (A.4) gives
M(1 + χ)πd(ϕd)
k(σ − 1)γ
k − ξ = (1 − un)Lw̄n. (A.5)
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Substituting πd(ϕd) = (1 − un)w̄n from Eq. (11) and (1 + χ)M = Nn − L from the resource
constraint, we obtain
(Nn − L)
k(σ − 1)γ
k − ξ = L. (A.6)
Solving Eq. (A.6) for L establishes Eq. (17). This completes the proof.
A.4 Derivation of Eqs. (20) and (21)
Combining Eqs. (1) and (2) with the assumption that one unit of labour input produces one unit
of task output, we can infer
ld(ϕ)
ld(ϕd)
=
qd(ϕ)/ϕ
qd(ϕd)/ϕd
=
(
pd(ϕ)
pd(ϕd)
)−σ ( ϕ
ϕd
)σ−1
. (A.7)
Accounting for constant markup pricing and substituting Eq. (5) for c(ϕ), and wd(ϕ)/wd(ϕd) =
(ϕ/ϕd)
θξ from Eq. (8), we can compute
ln ld(ϕ) = ln ld(ϕd) + (1 − θ)ξ[lnϕ− lnϕd]. (A.8)
Noting that constant markup pricing establishes wd(ϕd)ld(ϕd) = (σ − 1)πd(ϕd), whereas the
solution to the occupational choice problem in combination with the fair-wage constraint gives
wd(ϕd) = πd(ϕd), we have ld(ϕd) = σ − 1. Furthermore, cutoff productivity ϕd is linked to the
mass of firms by means of M/Nn = ϕ
−k
d . To determine M/Nn, we can substitute Eq. (17) for L
in resource constraint Nn = L+ (1 + χ)M . Solving the resulting expression for M/Nn gives
M
Nn
=
k − ξ
(1 + χ)[k − ξ + (1 − γ)k(σ − 1)] . (A.9)
Taking logs and substituting Eq. (15) for γ, we obtain (1 − θ)ξ lnϕd = µ(η̂), where µ(η̂) is given
by Eq. (23). Substitution into Eq. (A.8) establishes Eq. (20). Thereby, we express firm-level
employment (in logs) as a function of ϕ and the market effects common to all firms, depending
solely on the level of η̂.
To determine the domestic employment level of offshoring firms, we make use of constant
markup pricing to express domestic employment of domestic and offshoring producers as functions
of their operating profits. This gives
ld(ϕ) = (σ − 1)
πd(ϕ)
wd(ϕ)
and lo(ϕ) = (1 − η̂)(σ − 1)
πo(ϕ)
wo(ϕ)
, (A.10)
respectively, using the fact that offshoring firms produce only a fraction 1 − η̂ of their tasks
domestically. Accounting for Eq. (10), we can express the firm-level employment effect of offshoring
(in logs) as follows:
ln lo(ϕ) − ln ld(ϕ) = ln(1 − η̂) + (1 − θ)ξ ln κ. (A.11)
Substituting Eq. (6′) for κ, we obtain λ(η̂) = ln lo(ϕ) − ln ld(ϕ) in Eq. (22). Eq. (21) is then
obtained by adding λ(η̂) to Eq. (20). This completes the proof.
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A.5 The properties of λ(η̂) and a characterisation of t1
Differentiating λ(η̂), we can show that there exists a unique η̂tm = 1/a, with a ≡ t(1 − θ)ξ, such
that λ′(η̂) >,=, < 0 if η̂ >,=, < η̂tm. Then, η̂tm < 1 requires a > 1. However, this is not sufficient
for η̂tm < η̂int. Combining Eqs. (6
′) and (13), we can infer that η̂tm = η̂int is reached if
Γ(a) = − 1
1 − θ
[
a ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+ 1
]
− ln 2 = 0, (A.12)
where Γ(a) = 0 can be transformed into Eq. (24), when substituting a = t(1 − θ)ξ. Since
lima→1 Γ(a) = ∞, lima→∞ Γ(a) = − ln 2 and Γ′(a) < 0, we know that Γ(a) = 0 has a unique
solution in a and, in extension, also in t, which we denote by t1. Finally, η̂tm < η̂int requires
Γ(a) < 0 and thus t > t1. This completes the proof.
A.6 Properties of µ(η̂) and characterisation of η̂1p
From Eqs. (6′) and (13), we can infer that
χ(η̂) =
{
(1 − η̂)−tξ exp[−tξη̂] − 1
}
k
ξ , χ′(η̂) = tkχ(η̂)
k−ξ
k (1 + χξ/k)
η̂
1 − η̂ . (A.13)
Differentiation of µ(η̂) then gives
µ′(η̂) = − (1 − θ)ξ
k(k − ξ)
χ′(η̂)f(η̂)
1 + χ(η̂) + [k(σ − 1)/(k − ξ)]
[
1 + (1 − η̂)χ(η̂) − η̂χ(η̂)k−ξk
] , (A.14)
with
f(η̂) ≡ k − ξ + k(σ − 1)
[
1 − η̂ − 1
tk
1 − η̂
η̂
− k − ξ
k
η̂χ(η̂)−
ξ
k
]
. (A.15)
In view of χ′(η̂) > 0, it is immediate that µ′(η̂) >,=, < 0 if 0 >,=, < f(η̂). From limη̂→0 f(η̂) =
−∞, we can thus conclude that µ(η̂) increases at low levels of η̂. This leaves two possible outcomes:
µ′(η̂) > 0 for all possible η̂; µ′(η̂) = 0 at some η̂ ∈ (0, 1). In the latter case, µ(η̂) has an interior
extremum, and we show in the following that if an interior extremum exists, it is unique and, in
view of µ′(0) > 0, a maximum. This is equivalent to showing that f(η̂) = 0 has a unique interior
solution, provided that it has a solution at all.
Differentiation of f(η̂) gives
f ′(η̂) = −k(σ − 1)
1 − η̂
{
1 − η̂ − 1
tk
1 − η̂
η̂
− k − ξ
k
η̂χ(η̂)−
ξ
k − 1
tk
(
1 − η̂
η̂
)2
+
k − ξ
k
χ−
ξ
k g(η̂)
}
, (A.16)
with g(η̂) ≡ 1 − tξη̂2χ(η̂)−ξ/k[1 + χ(η̂)ξ/k]. Evaluated at f(η̂) = 0, we find that the first three
terms in the bracket expression add up to [f(η̂) − (k − ξ)]/[k(σ − 1)] = −(k − ξ)/[k(σ − 1)] < 0.
Thus, g(η̂) ≤ 0 is sufficient for an extremum of µ(η̂) to be a maximum and, if g(η̂) ≤ 0 holds for all
possible η̂, this maximum must be unique. Substituting χ(η̂) from the main text we can compute
limη̂→0 g(η̂) = −1 and g(1) = 1 − tξ < 0, where the negative sign of g(1) follows from assumption
t > t1 and the observation that t > t1 requires t(1 − θ)ξ > 1 (see Appendix A.5). Furthermore,
we can compute g′(η̂) =
{
2 + [g(η̂) − 1](1 − η̂)tξ−1 exp[η̂tξ]
}
[g(η̂) − 1]/η̂. Since g(η̂) = 1 is ruled
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out for any η̂ ≥ 0, we can readily conclude that g′(η̂) = 0 is only possible if g(η̂) < 0. Accordingly,
g(η̂) is either monotonic in η̂ or has a (not necessarily unique) extremum with negative function
value. In both cases, g(0) = −1 and g(1) = 1− tξ < 0 are sufficient for g(η̂) to have a negative sign
for all possible η̂. Together with our earlier results this implies that µ(η̂) has unique maximum,
which is either in the interior of interval (1, η̂int) and determined by µ
′(η̂) = 0 or it is given by the
corner solution η̂int if µ
′(η̂) > 0 for all possible η̂. In both cases, we denote the maximum of µ(η̂)
by η̂1p. This completes the proof.
A.7 Characterisation of t2 and the ranking of η̂
1
p and η̂tm
We now show that under parameter constraint (25), there exists a unique t2, such that 0 >,=, <
f(η̂tm) and thus µ
′(η̂tm) >,=, < 0 if t >,=, < t2. Evaluating f(η̂) at η̂tm = [t(1 − θ)ξ]−1 gives
f(η̂tm) = (k − ξ)[1 + (σ − 1)f0(a)], with
f0(a) ≡
[
k − (1 − θ)ξ
k − ξ −
1
n(a)
]
a− 1
a
, n(a) ≡ (a− 1)
{
(
a− 1
a
)− a
1−θ
exp
[
− 1
1 − θ
]
− 1
}
,
and a ≡ t(1 − θ)ξ>1. Hence, f(η̂tm) < 0 requires 1 + (σ − 1)f0 < 0. Function f0(a) has the
following two properties, which we formally show in a technical supplement that is available upon
request:
1. There exists a unique a ∈ (1,∞), such that f0(a) >,=, < 0 if a >,=, < a;
2. If f0(a) has an extremum at a > a, this must be a minimum.
From property 1 it follows that lima→∞ f0(a) < 0, which is equivalent to 1 − θ + θk/(k − ξ) > 0.
Accordingly, the formal condition for 1 + (σ − 1) lima→∞ f0(a) < 0 is given by (25). Furthermore,
from property 2, we can infer that either f0(a) is negatively sloped over the whole interval (a,∞)
or there exists a unique â0 > a, such that f0(a) decreases over subinterval (a, â0) and increases over
subinterval (â0,∞). Under parameter constraint (25), condition 1 + (σ − 1)f0(a2) = 0 therefore
determines a unique t2 = a2/[(1−θ)ξ], such that 0 >,=, < 1+(σ−1)f0(a) and thus µ(η̂tm) >,=, < 0
if t >,=, < t2. This completes the proof.
A.8 Characterisation of η̂0p
Let η̂0p be implicitly defined by λ
′(η̂) + µ′(η̂) = 0. Then, existence of η̂0p ∈ (0, η̂tm) is guaranteed
if (i) λ′(0) + µ′(0) < 0 and (ii) λ′(η̂tm) + µ
′(η̂tm) > 0 hold. The second condition follows from
the observation that (by definition) λ′(η̂tm) = 0 and µ
′(η̂tm) > 0 if parameter constraint (25) and
t > max{t1, t2} hold. To show that the first condition is also fulfilled, we can compute
λ′(η̂) + µ′(η̂) = −[1 − t(1 − θ)ξ] 1
1 − η̂ − t(1 − θ)ξ
− (1 − θ)ξ
k
χ′(η̂)f(η̂)
(k − ξ)[1 + χ(η̂)] + k(σ − 1)
[
1 + (1 − η̂)χ(η̂) − η̂χ(η̂)k−ξk
] , (A.17)
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according to Eqs. (22) and (A.14). This establishes
lim
η̂→0
[
λ′(η̂) + µ′(η̂)
]
= −1 − (1 − θ)ξ
k(kσ − ξ) limη̂→0χ
′(η̂)f(η̂). (A.18)
From Eq. (A.13) it follows that limη̂→0 χ
′(η̂) = 0. Substituting Eq. (A.15) for f(η̂), we can then
compute
lim
η̂→0
[
λ′(η̂) + µ′(η̂)
]
= −1 − t(1 − θ)ξ(σ − 1)(k − ξ)
kσ − ξ limη̂→0
η̂2
1 − η̂ χ(η̂)
1−2 ξ
k ,
= −1 − 2(1 − θ)(σ − 1)(k − ξ)
kσ − ξ limη̂→0
{
(1 − η̂)−tξ exp[−η̂tξ] − 1
}
k−ξ
ξ , (A.19)
which establishes λ′(0) + µ′(0) = −1 and completes the proof.
A.9 Derivation of Eq. (28)
Adding up domestic employment over all purely domestic and offshoring firms in the source country
gives
(1 − un)L = Nn
[
∫ ϕo
ϕd
ld (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕo
lo (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
]
. (A.20)
Substituting Eqs. (20) and (21) and using ld (ϕd) = σ − 1, we can compute
(1 − un)L = Mld(ϕd)β(η̂)
k
k − (1 − θ) ξ , (A.21)
with β(η̂) ≡ 1 + χ(η̂)1−(1−θ)ξ/k {exp[λ(η̂)] − 1}. Furthermore, making use of Eq. (A.4) and noting
that constant markup pricing implies (σ− 1)π(ϕd) = ld(ϕd)wn(ϕd), we can express the total wage
bill in the North as follows:
(1 − un)Lw̄n = Mld(ϕd)wn(ϕd)(1 − γ)[1 + χ(η̂)]
k
k − ξ , (A.22)
Together Eqs. (A.21) and (A.22) determine the wage ratio w(ϕd)/w̄ = δ(η̂)(k − ξ)/[k − (1 − θ)ξ],
where we have used δ(η̂) ≡ β(η̂)/ {(1 − γ)[1 + χ(η̂)]}. Substitution into Eq. (27) then establishes
Eq. (28).
A.10 Offshoring and the unemployment rate of production workers un
From Eq. (28), we can infer that offshoring decreases (increases) unemployment rate un relative to
autarky, if δ(η̂) > (<)1. Substituting Eqs. (15), (22), and (A.13) for γ, λ(η̂), and χ(η̂), respectively,
and accounting for β(η̂) from Appendix A.9, it follows that δ(η̂) >,=, < 1 is equivalent to
{
(1 − η̂)−tξ exp[−tξη̂] − 1
}
k−ξ
ξ
+θ {
(1 − η̂)1−t(1−θ)ξ exp[−η̂t(1 − θ)ξ] − 1
}
>,=, <
{
(1 − η̂)−tξ exp[−η̂tξ] − 1
}
k−ξ
ξ
{
(1 − η)1−tξ exp[−η̂tξ] − 1
}
. (A.23)
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Let us define
ψ(η̂) ≡
{
(1 − η̂)−tξ exp[−η̂tξ] − 1
}θ
, ψ1(η̂) ≡ (1 − η̂)1−tξ exp[−η̂tξ] − 1, (A.24)
ψ2(η̂) ≡ (1 − η̂)1−t(1−θ)ξ exp[−η̂t(1 − θ)ξ] − 1. (A.25)
Then, ψ1(η̂) = 0 characterises a unique η̂
1
b > 0, such that ψ1(η̂) >,=, < 0 if η̂ >,=, < η̂
1
b .
Furthermore, we know from the main text that ψ2(η̂) has a unique minimum at η̂tm, whereas
ψ2(η̂) = 0 characterises a unique η̂
2
b > η̂
1
b , such that ψ2(η̂) >,=, < 0 if η̂ >,=, < η̂
2
b . It is worth
noting that t > max{t1, t2} is sufficient for η̂tm < η̂int, but not for η̂1b , η̂2b < η̂int.
Let us now define ψ̂(η̂) ≡ ψ1(η̂)/ψ2(η̂). We can then infer from (A.23) that δ(η̂) >,=, < 1 is
equivalent to ψ̂(η̂) >,=, < ψ(η̂) if η̂ < η̂2b , whereas δ(η̂) >,=, < 1 is equivalent to ψ(η̂) >,=, <
ψ̂(η̂) if η̂ > η̂2b . We can distinguish the following cases, regarding the sign and size of ψ̂(η̂): (i)
0 > ψ1(η̂) > ψ2(η̂) and thus ψ̂(η̂) ∈ (0, 1) if η̂ < η̂1b ; (ii) ψ1(η̂) > 0 > ψ2(η̂) and thus ψ̂(η̂) < 0 if
η̂ ∈ (η̂1b , η̂2b ); (iii) ψ1(η̂) > ψ2(η̂) > 0 and thus ψ̂(η̂) > 1 if η̂ > η̂2b .16 We can thus safely conclude
that ψ(η̂) > ψ̂(η̂) and thus δ(η̂) < 1 if η̂ ∈ (η̂1b , η̂2b ), whereas ψ(η̂) < ψ̂(η̂) and thus δ(η̂) < 1 if
η̂ > η̂2b and at the same time η̂ < η̂int. The latter follows from the observation that ψ(η̂) < 1 for
all η̂ < η̂int. In both cases (and hence whenever η̂ ≥ η̂1b ), the unemployment rate of production
workers in the North is higher under offshoring than in autarky. We now look at the remaining
domain and note first that ψ(η̂) increases over interval (0, η̂int) from a minimum level of ψ(0) = 0
to a maximum level of ψ(η̂int) = 1. Hence, showing that ψ̂(η̂) falls monotonically over interval
[0, η̂1b ] from a maximum level of ψ̂(0) = 1 to a minimum level of ψ̂
(
η̂1b
)
= 0, suffices to prove that
ψ(η̂) = ψ̂(η̂) has a unique solution η̂u < η̂int, such that ψ(η̂) >,=, < ψ̂(η̂) if η̂ >,=, < η̂u. This
can be done by using higher differentials of ψ̂(η̂) and a detailed proof for this result is provided
in a technical supplement, which is available upon request. We can thus safely conclude that
1 >,=, < δ(η̂) if η̂ >,=, < η̂u. This completes the proof.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 2
We can write the economy-wide unemployment in the North as Un = ΛU
a
n , with
Λ(η̂) ≡ unL
uanL
a
=
θξ + (k − ξ) [1 − δ(η̂)]
θξ
[k − ξ + k(σ − 1)](1 − γ)
k − ξ + k(σ − 1)(1 − γ) (A.26)
and superscript a referring to autarky. That offshoring increases the economy-wide rate of un-
employment in the North at low levels of η̂ then follows from the observation that δ(η̂) > 1 and
thus u < ua if η̂ < η̂u (see above) and the fact that the number of production workers decreases
monotonically in η̂. Furthermore, the economy-wide rate of unemployment U is larger (smaller)
at η̂ = η̂int and thus χ = 1 than under autarky if Λ(η̂int) > (<)1, which is equivalent to
1 − θξ
θξ + (1 − 2−θ)(kσ − ξ) > (<)η̂int. (A.27)
Taking into account that η̂int is implicitly defined as function of t by χ = 1 and thus by {(1 −
η̂int)
−tξ exp[−η̂inttξ] − 1}k/ξ = 1, it follows that limt→0 η̂int = 1, limt→∞ η̂int = 0, and dη̂int/dt < 0.
16For completeness, we also have limη̂→0 ψ̂(η̂) = 1, ψ̂(η̂
1
b ) = 0, limη̂→η̂2−
b
ψ̂(η̂) = −∞, and lim
η̂→η̂
2+
b
ψ̂(η̂) = ∞.
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Hence, there exists a unique t for which (A.27) holds with equality. This critical t is denoted tU
and given by
tU ≡
ln 2
ξ (1 − ζ − ln ζ) , ζ ≡
θξ
θξ + (1 − 2−θ)[kσ − ξ] . (A.28)
For t >,=, < tU , we have Λ(η̂int) >,=, < 1. This completes the proof.
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S Supplement
S.1 Further descriptives: Robustness of Figure 1
In this supplement, we present further descriptive evidence for a u-shape in the employment changes
of German establishments over the wage distribution. For this purpose, we use establishment
information from the Linked Employer-Employee Dataset of the Institute for Employment Research
in Nuremberg (LIAB) and consider all establishments from this dataset, for which we have the
relevant information in the base and the end year of the observation period.17 We proceed as
in the main text, rank firms by their mean wages in 1999, assign them to groups of symmetric
size, and display employment changes for each establishment group (in log difference), which we
normalise by the overall trend in the data in order to control for macroeconomic shocks that
are common to all establishments. To highlight the u-shape, we run a regression based on local
polynominal smoothing.18 We rely on a smoothing algorithm that is based on Epanechnikov
kernel-weighting with degree 1 and determine the optimal bandwidth by using the rule-of thumb
method of bandwidth selection that minimizes the conditional weighted mean integrated squared
error (see Fan and Gijbels, 1996).
In the first two robustness checks depicted by Figure S.1, we change the length of the observation
period. In Panel A, we consider the shorter period of 1999-2003. Whereas this increases the number
of observations in the balanced establishment panel to 7,584, reducing the time span may make
the data more vulnerable to business cycle effects, in particular if these effects are different for
establishments from different wage categories. In Panel B, we consider the longer period of 1999-
2007. This reduces the number of establishments to 4,442. Both exercises provide further support
for a job polarisation across firms as displayed in Figure 1.
Figure S.1: Job polarisation between German establishments – Alternative time spans
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Panel A: Observation period 1999-2003 Panel B: Observation period 1999-2007
Source: LIAB dataset from the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg. Dots capture employment changes for
20 establishment groups (of equal size); Solid lines depict the outcome of local polynominal smoothing, using Epanechnikov
kernel-weighting with degree 1 and (rule-of-thumb) bandwidth 1.37 for Panel A and 2.59 for Panel B.
In a further set of robustness checks displayed in Figure S.2, we keep the initial observation
period of 1999-2005 but change the number of wage groups to which we assign the 5,754 establish-
ments from the data. In Panel A, we assign the establishments to 10 groups (of equal size) and thus
17For detailed information on how the LIAB data is constructed, see Klein et al. (2013).
18A clear advantage of local polynomial smoothing is that it performs better than other smoothing methods near
the bounds of the data interval.
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build the analysis of employment changes on more aggregated data. In Panel B, we consider 100
different establishment groups and thus rely on more disaggregated data. Both exercises provide
further supportive evidence for a job polarisation across German establishments over the period
1999-2005.
Figure S.2: Job polarisation between German establishments – Alternative group specifications
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Panel A: 10 establishment groups Panel B: 100 establishment groups
Source: LIAB dataset from the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg. Dots capture employment changes
for 10/100 establishment groups (of equal size); Solid lines depict the outcome of local polynominal smoothing, using
Epanechnikov kernel-weighting with degree 1 and (rule-of-thumb) bandwidth 0.93 for Panel A and 6.53 for Panel B.
Figure S.3 summarises the insights from two additional experiments. In Panel A, we use
establishment information on offshoring for the year 1999 to restrict the analysis to incumbent
offshorers, i.e. to those 1,576 establishments in our dataset that conducted offshoring already in
the first observation period, and we report for the period 1999-2005 the employment changes
for this subsample of establishments. We see that a u-shape in the employment changes along
the wage distribution is not observed for incumbent offhorers and conclude from this observation
that asymmetric behavior of offshoring and non-offshoring firms is crucial for the existence of job
polarisation in Germany. In Panel B, we use the same data as in Figure 1 but exclude entrepreneurs
and managers from the worker sample. This leaves the pattern of job polarisation unaffected.
Figure S.3: Job polarisation between German establishments – Further robustness checks
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Panel A: Incumbent offshorers only Panel B: Exclusion of entrepreneurs and managers
Source: LIAB dataset from the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg. Dots capture employment changes for
20 establishment groups (of equal size); Solid lines depict the outcome of local polynominal smoothing. Solid lines depict
the outcome of local polynominal smoothing, using Epanechnikov kernel-weighting with degree 1 and (rule-of-thumb)
bandwidth 1.86 for Panel A and 1.87 for Panel B.
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S.2 Background material for Appendix A.7: The properties of f0(a)
Let us first note that f0(1) = 0 and lima→∞ f0(a) = −[1 − θ− θk/(k− ξ)], which is negative under
parameter constraint (25). Twice differentiating f0(a) furthermore gives
f ′0(a) =
[
k − (1 − θ)ξ
k − ξ −
1
n(a)
] (
1
a
)2
+
n′(a)
n(a)2
a− 1
a
, (S.1)
f ′′0 (a) = −2
[
k − (1 − θ)ξ
k − ξ −
1
n(a)
] (
1
a
)3
+ 2
n′(a)
n(a)2
(
1
a
)2
− 2[n
′(a)]2
n(a)3
a− 1
a
+
n′′(a)
n(a)2
a− 1
a
, (S.2)
with lima→1 f
′
0(a) = [k − (1 − θ)ξ]/(k − ξ) > 0 and lima→∞ f ′0(a) = 0. Combining f0(1) = 0 and
f ′0(1) > 0 with lima→∞ f0(a) < 0 has the following two implications. On the one hand, there
must be an a ∈ (0, 1) for which f0(a) = 0 and f ′0(a) < 0 and, on the other hand, f0(a) must have
a maximum on interval (0, a). In the following, we show that f0(a) has a unique maximum on
interval (0,∞), implying that a must be unique as well, and that any extremum in interval (a,∞)
must be a minimum.
For this purpose, we note that an extremum of f0(a) requires f
′
0(a) = 0 and denote by â0 those
values of a that fulfill this condition. We then compute f ′′0 (â0) = f1(â0)[n(â0)]
−3â−10 , with
f1(a) = 2n
′(a)n(a) − (a− 1)[n′(a)]2 + (a− 1)n′′(a)n(a). (S.3)
Considering n(a) from Appendix A.7, we can compute
n′(a) = −
(
a− 1
a
)− a
1−θ
exp
[
− 1
1 − θ
] [
(a− 1) ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+ θ
]
1
1 − θ − 1, (S.4)
n′′(a) =
(
a− 1
a
)− a
1−θ
exp
[
− 1
1 − θ
]
1
1 − θ n̂(a), (S.5)
with
n̂(a) ≡
[
ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+
1
a− 1
]2 a− 1
1 − θ − 2 ln
(
a− 1
a
)
− 2a− 1
a(a− 1) . (S.6)
This establishes f1(a) = f2(a)[n(a) + (a− 1)]/[a(1 − θ)], with
f2(a) ≡ −
[
(
a− 1
a
)− a
1−θ
exp
[
− 1
1 − θ
]
+ 1
] {
[
(a− 1) ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+ 1
]2 a
1 − θ − 1
}
− 2. (S.7)
For the subsequent analysis, it is useful to introduce
v1(a) ≡ (a− 1) ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+ 1 ≥ 0, v2(a) ≡ 3 ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+
3a− 1
a(a− 1) ≥ 0, (S.8)
v3(a) ≡ (3a− 1) ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+ 3 ≤ 0, v4(a) ≡ (4a− 1) ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+ 4 ≤ 0, (S.9)
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with v2(a) = v
′
3(a). We can compute lima→1 f2(a) = −∞, lima→∞ f2(a) = 0, and
f ′2(a) =
1
1 − θ
v1(a)
a− 1
{
(
a− 1
a
)− a
1−θ
exp
[
− 1
1 − θ
] [
v1(a)
2 a
1 − θ − 1
]
−
[
(
a− 1
a
)− a
1−θ
exp
[
− 1
1 − θ
]
+ 1
]
(a− 1)v3(a)
}
.
Let us now hypothesise that f2(a) = 0 has a solution a0(θ) > 1 (a0, in short). Then, f
′
2(a0) >,=
, < 0 is equivalent to F (a0, θ) >,=, < 0, with
F (a, θ) ≡
[
v1(a)
2 a
1 − θ
]2
− 1 − 2(a− 1)v3(a). (S.10)
Differentiation of F (a) establishes
F ′a(a, θ) = 2
{[
v1(a)
3 a
(1 − θ)2 − 1
]
v3(a) − (a− 1)v2(a)
}
, (S.11)
F ′′aa(a, θ) = 2
{[
v1(a)
3 a
(1 − θ)2 − 2
]
v2(a) +
1
(1 − θ)2 v1(a)
2v3(a)v4(a) +
a+ 1
a2(a− 1)
}
. (S.12)
If F ′a(a, θ) = 0 has a solution at a1(θ) > 1 (a1, in short). Then, F
′′(a1, θ) >,=, < 0 is equivalent
to F0(a1) >,=, < 0, with
F0(a) ≡ −
2
av1(a)v3(a)
{
[(
2a ln
(
a− 1
a
)
+ 1
)
v1(a) − (a− 1)v3(a)v4(a)
]
v2(a)
−
[
v3(a)v4(a) +
a+ 1
a(a− 1)v1(a)
]
v3(a)
}
(S.13)
being independent of θ. It is tedious but straightforward to show that lima→1 F0(a) = −∞,
lima→∞ F0(a) = 0, and that F0(a) = 0 has a unique solution at a2 > 1, such that F0(a) >,=, < 0
if a >,=, < a2. The correctness of this result can be verified with any standard mathematics
software.
We can further note that lima→1 F
′
a(a, θ) = −∞, and lima→∞ F ′a(a, θ) = 0 hold for all θ ∈ (0, 1).
Let us assume that F ′a(a, θ) = 0 has a solution at a1(θ) ∈ [1,∞). For instance, this is the case
if θ → 0. Accounting for lima→1 F ′a(a, θ) = −∞ and F0(a) >,=, < 0 if a >,=, < a2, it follows
that a1(θ) is unique and larger than a2, i.e. a1(θ) > a2 > 1. However, this insight builds on the
presumption that F ′a(a, θ) = 0 has in fact a solution on interval [1,∞), which we have to check.
For this purpose, we solve F ′a(a, θ) = 0 for θ and denote the resulting expression by θ̂(a). In view
of Eq. (S.11), this gives
θ̂(a) ≡ 1 −
√
av1(a)3v3(a)
(a− 1)v2(a) + v3(a)
, (S.14)
with lima→1 θ̂(a) = 0, lima→∞ θ̂(a) = 1 −
√
6/4 ≡ θ̂1, and θ̂′(a) > 0.19 This has the following
19Provided that F ′a(a, θ) = 0 has a solution in θ on interval (0, 1), which is given by θ̂(a), we have F
′′
aθ(a, θ̂(a)) > 0
and F ′′aa(a, θ̂(a)) < 0 – due to a1(θ) > a2 and lima→1 F
′
a(a, θ) = −∞ (see above). Applying the implicit function
theorem to F ′a(a, θ) = 0 then establishes the positive sign of θ̂
′(a).
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implications. If θ < θ̂1, then F
′
a(a, θ) has a unique solution in a on interval (1,∞), which we
denote a1(θ) (see above). In this case, F
′
a(a, θ) >,=, < 0 if a >,=, < a1(θ). In contrast, if θ ≥ θ̂1,
F ′a(a, θ) < 0 holds for all possible a > 1.
With these insights at hand, we are now prepared to determine the sign of F (a, θ). For this
purpose, we can note that lima→1 F (a, θ) = θ(2−θ)/(1−θ)2 > 0 and lima→∞ F (a, θ) = 0, implying
that F (a, θ) > 0 holds for all possible finite values of a if θ ≥ θ̂1. In contrast, if θ < θ̂1, F (a, θ)
has an extremum at a1(θ), which, in view of a1(θ) > a2, must be a minimum. In this case, there
exists a unique a0(θ) < a1(θ), such that F (a, θ) >,=, < 0 if a0(θ) >,=, < a. Since we know
from above that f ′2(a) >,=, < 0 is equivalent to F (a, θ) >,=, < 0 and that lima→1 f2(a) = −∞,
lima→∞ f2(a) = 0, it is immediate that f2(a) < 0 holds for all possible finite values of a if θ ≥ θ̂1.
In contrast, if θ < θ̂1, f2(a) has an extremum at a0(θ), which – recollecting from above that
f ′2(a) >,=, < 0 if a0(θ) >,=, < a – must be a maximum. In this case, there exists a unique
a0(θ) < a0(θ), such that f2(a) >,=, < 0 if a >,=, < a0(θ). Our previous insights f0(1) = 0,
f ′0(1) > 0, and lima→∞ f0(a) < 0 imply that f0(a) must have at least one extremum at â0 > 1,
which must be a maximum (and thus requires f2(â0) < 0). If θ ≥ θ̂1, this extremum must be
unique, because in this case f2(a) < 0 holds for all possible finite values of a. If θ < θ̂1, f0(a)
may have a second extremum on interval a ∈ (1,∞), which then must be a minimum. Both
the conclusion that f0(a) cannot have more than two interior extrema and the conclusion that
f0(a) has exactly one maximum follow from the properties of f2(a) and the insight that in the
case of multiple extrema, a minimum must follow a maximum and vice versa. As an immediate
consequence of this, it follows that there must exist a unique a ∈ (1,∞), such that f0(a) >,=, < 0
if a >,=, < a. This completes the formal characterisation of the two properties of f0(a).
S.3 Background material for Appendix A.10: The negative sign of ψ̂′(η̂)
Differentiation of ψ̂(η̂) from Appendix A.10 establishes
ψ̂′(η̂) =
[1 − η̂t(1 − θ)ξ][1 + ψ2(η̂)]ψ1(η̂) − (1 − η̂tξ)[1 + ψ1(η̂)]ψ2(η̂)
(1 − η̂)[ψ2(η̂)]2
=
1 + ψ2(η̂)
(1 − η̂)[ψ2(η̂)]2
Ψ(η̂; θ, ξ), (S.15)
with
Ψ(η̂; θ, ξ) ≡ (1 − η̂tξ)[(1 − η̂)−tθξe−η̂tθξ − 1] + η̂tθξ[(1 − η̂)1−tξe−η̂tξ − 1], (S.16)
and ψ̂′(η̂) >,=, < 0 if Ψ(η̂; θ, ξ) >,=, < 0. Twice differentiating Ψ(·) with respect to θ (keeping ξ
constant) gives
Ψ′θ(η̂; θ, ξ) = −tξ(1 − η̂tξ)[ln(1 − η̂) + η̂](1 − η̂)−tθξ exp [−η̂tξ]
+ η̂tξ
{
(1 − η̂)1−tξ exp [−η̂tξ] − 1
}
, (S.17)
Ψ′′θθ(η̂; θ, ξ) = (tξ)
2(1 − η̂tξ)[ln(1 − η̂) + η̂]2(1 − η̂)−tθξ exp [−η̂tξ] > 0. (S.18)
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Hence, if Ψ(η̂; θ, ξ) has an extremum in θ, it must be a minimum. We can now compute
Ψ(η̂; 1, ξ) = (1 − η̂tξ)
{
(1 − η̂)−tξ exp [−η̂tξ] − 1
}
+ η̂tξ
{
(1 − η̂)1−tξ exp [−η̂tξ] − 1
}
. (S.19)
Differentiating the latter with respect to η̂ gives
Ψη̂(η̂; 1, ξ) = tξη̂(1 − η̂)−tξ exp [−η̂tξ]
{
(1 − η̂tξ) η̂
1 − η̂ − 1
}
, (S.20)
which, in view of t > 1/ξ (which is always fulfilled if t > t1), is unambiguously negative. Since
Ψ(0; 1, ξ) = 0, we can therefore safely conclude that Ψ(η̂; 1, ξ) < 0 holds for all η̂ > 0. Combining
this with Ψ(η̂; 0, ξ) = 0, it follows from Ψ′′θθ(η̂; θ, ξ) > 0 that Ψ(η̂; θ, ξ) < 0 holds for all possible
θ̂, η̂ > 0, proving that ψ̂′(η̂) < 0.
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